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CORNEA, CARNAP, AND
CURRENT CLOSURE BEFUDDLEMENT
Stephen J. Wykstra

Graham and Maitzen think my CORNEA principle is in trouble because it
entails “intolerable violations of closure under known entailment.” I argue
that the trouble arises from current befuddlement about closure itself, and
that a distinction drawn by Rudolph Carnap, suitably extended, shows
how closure, when properly understood, works in tandem with CORNEA.
CORNEA does not obey Closure because it shouldn’t: it applies to “dynamic”
epistemic operators, whereas closure principles hold only for “static” ones.
What the authors see as an intolerable vice of CORNEA is actually a virtue,
helping us see what closure principles should—and shouldn’t—themselves
be about.

Over the years, CORNEA—my “Condition of ReasoNable Epistemic Access”—has gotten a mixed reception. Graham and Maitzen1 (hereafter “the
authors”) find CORNEA in deep trouble: it entails, they think, “intolerable
violations of closure under known entailment” (hereafter just “Closure”).
I agree that CORNEA doesn’t obey Closure. But I don’t agree that this is
trouble for CORNEA, and welcome this chance to say why.2
Though the authors don’t mention it, Closure has itself been under a
cloud of befuddlement since the mid-1970s.3 John Hawthorne notes that
many now embrace “the idea that no version of the closure principle
is true”—to the dismay of others like Richard Feldman, who finds this
“among the least plausible ideas to gain currency in epistemology in recent years.”4 In large part, the cloud over Closure arises because, as many
see it, unpalatable skeptical consequences follow from Closure combined
with other principles that are judged even more compelling than Closure.
And chief among these other principles, we will see, is a version of what I
have called CORNEA.
In saying this, my aim isn’t to shift the trouble from CORNEA to
Closure. I’m a fan of Closure, and want to help both CORNEA and Closure stay out of trouble. To do this, I want here to extend a distinction
made by Rudolph Carnap. The “Carnapian Distinction,” as I’ll call it, was
built into CORNEA from the outset, but its relevance to Closure seems to
me underappreciated. I begin, in sections 1 through 3, by giving a wider view of CORNEA, Closure, and their apparent troubles. In sections
4 through 7, I explain Carnap’s distinction and show how extending it
helps relieve these troubles. Section 8 locates two key errors in the authors’ critique of CORNEA.
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1. What CORNEA Says: A Wider View

CORNEA emerged in response to William Rowe’s inductive arguments
from evil. Rowe begins from suﬀerings for which we see no good suﬃcient
to justify the theistic God in allowing this suﬀering; Rowe then urges that
such data—our seeing no such good for select suﬀerings—is5 strong inductive support for there being no such good (and hence, by a short further
step, for there being no God). Initially, Rowe put this in the appears-idiom:
by virtue of our seeing no good for the suﬀerings, he said, “it appears that
there is no such good.” CORNEA thus was also initially put in the appearsidiom. Later Rowe morphed to a probabilistic idiom; CORNEA morphed
to keep up. The authors focus on CORNEA in its appears-version, but the
same issues arise for later versions.
On all versions, the key idea behind CORNEA is a proposed test for
whether some alleged evidence E seriously “supports”—in a sense to be
clarified presently—some hypothesis H. The test is this: ask whether, if H
were false, E is still pretty much what one should expect. If the answer is
“Yes,” then E can’t seriously support H. For example, let H be the hypothesis that there are no HIV viruses on a specific hypodermic needle about
to go into your arm, and let E be the datum that on close visual inspection,
the doctor sees no such viruses on the needle. Does his seeing no such
viruses seriously support the claim that there are none? Using the test,
we ask: “if H were false (if there were viruses present), is E (your seeing
none) still pretty much expectable?” The answer is “Yes”; the idea behind
CORNEA is that E can’t then seriously support H. And here this result
seems just right.
This requirement on the supports-relation is the key idea behind
CORNEA. But CORNEA itself proposes a higher-level test-condition—a
requirement on rational (justified, entitled) claims about the supportsrelation. The condition is this: for some human H (Henry, let’s say) to be
entitled6 to claim that new evidence E seriously supports H, it must be
reasonable for Henry to believe (should he consider the matter) that the
answer to the test question is “No.” Let’s put this in the epistemic“ appears” idiom (as Rowe initially put his case). Suppose the doctor inspects
the needle and sees no HIV viruses. Is he, on the basis of this cognitive
situation, entitled to say “It appears that there are no HIV viruses on this
needle”? CORNEA says he is entitled to say this only if the following
condition is met: that it is reasonable for him to believe, given what he
has to go on, that if the italicized claim were false (i.e., if there were HIV
viruses on the needle), his visual data would be diﬀerent (with respect
to the no-see feature) than it is. For a normal doctor this condition is of
course not met, so the doctor isn’t entitled to the make the appears-claim.
Again this result seems just right, and generalizing it gives CORNEA in
its oﬃcial 1984 formulation:7
On the basis of cognized situation s, human H is entitled to claim
“It appears that p” only if it is reasonable for H to believe that,
given her cognitive faculties and the use she has made of them, if p
were not the case, s would likely be diﬀerent8 than it is in some way
discernible by her.
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It is, as we will see, this 1984 version that the authors indict for “intolerable violations of closure.” But their indictment will apply equally (well or
not) to later versions as well.
2. Trouble in CORNEA-land
What the authors call “the principle of closure under known entailment”
is, as I see it, not so much one principle as a family of principles. Like
CORNEA, these too spring from a core intuition: if you are to a certain degree “epistemically well-oﬀ ” with respect to p, and you see that p entails
q, then you are at least equally well-oﬀ with respect to q. Here there are
a family of epistemic operators covering aspects of being “epistemically
well-oﬀ.” Letting “knows*” represent this family of operators, closure
principles thus take roughly9 the following form:
If Sam knows* that p, and Sam knows that p entails q, then it is also
the case that Sam knows* that q.
To bring CORNEA into conflict with Closure, the authors use a brain-invat scenario. I will simplify it a bit. Suppose you’ve stayed up late worrying that you might be a brain in a vat. You finally get to sleep, but wake
up before dawn still worrying. A glance shows your bedside alarm clock
reading “5:59 A.M.”—one minute before you set it to ring. You presently
hear a ringing sound, and so have the new evidential input E:
(E) I am experiencing the familiar sound of my alarm clock ringing.
Now this seems to support the hypothesis
(R) The alarm clock next to my bed is ringing
and CORNEA nicely allows this: after all, if the alarm next to your bed
were not ringing, it’s not expectable that you’d be experiencing that familiar ringing sound. The trouble arises because, despite your worries, you
also believe:
(~BIV) I’m not an envatted brain wired to a super-sophisticated computer that simulates exactly this familiar ringing sound (along
with the rest of my experience of the virtual day to follow).
Here it is crucial to see that BIV is not just a general brain-in-vat hypothesis. It is very specific: your envatted brain is connected to a computer that
simulates the exact phenomenal reality of your alarm clock ringing (and the
rest of your day). Let’s call this the Phat-Vat Hypothesis.10
As the authors see it, the Phat Vat hypothesis gets CORNEA in closure
trouble on account of three claims. Claim 1 is that, as we have seen, R (in
relation to E) passes the CORNEA test: CORNEA thus allows that E can11
seriously support R. Claim 2 is that ~BIV flunks the CORNEA test, for if ~BIV
were false (i.e., if you were a brain in the Phat Vat), your experience would not
be diﬀerent than it is. So CORNEA says that the experienced ringing cannot
seriously support ~BIV.12 But—Claim 3—R obviously entails ~BIV (and you
see that it does). This gives traction to Closure: if E supports R, it must also
support ~BIV. CORNEA, the authors think, thus violates Closure.
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The violation looks especially egregious in the appears mode. For here
CORNEA entails that you can be entitled to say “It appears that my alarm
is ringing” even though you are not entitled to say “It appears that I am not
a brain in the Phat Vat (hearing a merely virtual alarm).” But how could
this be? How could you be entitled to claim that it appears (epistemically)
that A, see that A entails13 B, and yet not be entitled to claim that it appears
that B? Indeed, the authors urge that by CORNEA, you can sometimes be
entitled to say “It appears that A&B”, see that A&B entails B, and yet not
be entitled to say “It appears that B.”14 Deeming such closure-violations
“intolerable,” they rhetorically ask:
How could your total evidence support a conjunction while failing to
support one of its conjuncts? How could you be evidentially betteroﬀ with respect to (p & q) than you are with respect to p?
3. Trouble in Closure-land
But, as noted earlier, many these days see Closure itself as in trouble. The
trouble has been spotlighted by the rise of contextualism, which seeks to
exploit (and relieve) the pressure toward skepticism by scenarios of both
the global brain-in-vat sort, and of a more local variety. Reviewing a local
scenario will open the territory I want to explore.
Dretske’s well-known zebra case is as good as any. You are at the zoo in
front of the zebra cage, looking at the striped equine therein. Common sense
says that your visual data strongly supports, indeed allows you to know*:
(Z) The animal in front of me is a zebra.
But (Z) entails, as you see, that
(~PID) The animal is not a donkey cleverly painted in stripes to look
like a zebra.
Now if Closure holds, then if on looking at the striped equine in the cage
you know* Z, you also know* that ~PID. But does your visual data really
allow you to know* that it’s not a painted-in-stripes donkey? Many deem
Closure here in trouble, for they judge it is clear that your data doesn’t
allow you to know this.15 It doesn’t, because “after all” (as Stewart Cohen
puts it)16
[T]hat’s just how it would look if it were a cleverly disguised mule.
So in the judgment of many, the look of the striped equine doesn’t enable
you to know* ~PID, because “that’s just how it would look if it were a cleverly disguised mule.” But if this is a principled judgment, the underlying
principle is something like this: the data can’t enable you to know it’s not
an X, if the data is just how it would look if it were an X. But this principle
is, heaven help us, just a version of CORNEA. From a wider view, then,
the trouble which the authors lay at CORNEA’s feet is just what leads
many to abandon Closure (and what drives yet others into the arms of
contextualism).
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4. The Carnapian Distinction
CORNEA , we’ve seen, is meant to test claims that some alleged evidence
E (our seeing no HIV-viruses on the needle) provides serious “rational support” for some hypothesis H (there being no HIV viruses on the needle). But
what does “rational support” mean here? In first introducing CORNEA
(and in later refining it), I distinguished between “weak” and “strong”
senses of support, and then noted that both senses are “dynamic,” and to
be separated from a “static” sense of the term:17
Both [strong and weak] senses of ‘disconfirms’ [and confirms] are
dynamic, involving the degree to which the adduced evidence
changes the likelihood of a claim from its likelihood on our background knowledge, and are thus to be distinguished from the ‘static’
sense (which Plantinga addresses) of the probability of a claim with
respect to the adduced evidence alone.
This dynamic/static distinction was made by Rudolph Carnap within
a probabilistic approach to inductive logic.18 Carnap observed that it is
one thing for hypothesis H to be (statically) improbable on some body
of evidence, and quite another thing for H to be rendered improbable
by some new piece of evidence. Suppose that we are playing poker, that
I am dealt a hand, and that I look at it and see that it contains no aces.19
On my evidence, it is highly improbable that (H) you have four aces.
In the static sense of “supports,” my evidence supports this H. But that
you have four aces has not, by my new evidence (seeing I hold no aces),
become improbable or less probable. To the contrary, my seeing that I hold
no aces raises the probability that you hold four aces: it renders this more
likely than before. In the dynamic sense of supports (or confirms), my
new evidence supports H: it changes its probability, and does so in the
“upwards” direction.
Using the same example, we can see that the same distinction applies,
in a kind of analogical extension, to a whole range of epistemic operators.
Consider the epistemic operator “justified.” Let E be the evidential situation of my having seen my new hand containing no aces. I am, on my evidence, justified in believing that you do not hold four aces. But I have not,
by seeing my hand, become (more) justified in believing this about your
hand. To the contrary, I have, by my new evidence, become somewhat less
justified than before in believing this.
The distinction also applies to epistemic appears-claims. I am, when
in the cognitive situation of finding that I hold no aces, entitled to say
“It appears that you are not holding four aces.” But I have not, by this
finding (or on the basis of it), become (more) entitled to say “It appears
that you are not holding four aces. That is, my degree of entitlement
to this claim has not, by my new finding, been increased; indeed it has
been decreased.
I shall refer to Carnap’s distinction, when extended in the above ways,
as “the Carnapian Distinction.”
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5. Applying the Carnapian Distinction

In sections 2 and 3, we saw how the Phat Vat case seems to get not just
CORNEA but also Closure in trouble. In that case, CORNEA says that E
(your experiencing the ringing sound) can seriously support R (that you
hear your real alarm clock ringing) but cannot seriously support ~BIV
(that you are not in a Phat Vat). But you see that R clearly entails ~BIV, so
Closure seems to require that if your experience supports R it also support ~BIV. The trouble, we saw, looks especially bad in the appears idiom,
allowing the authors to twist the knife:
How could your total evidence support a conjunction while failing
to support one of its conjuncts? How could you be evidentially better-oﬀ with respect to (p & q) than you are with respect to p?
But the Carnapian Distinction uncovers equivocation here. What
CORNEA says is that E can’t support ~BIV in the dynamic sense (though
it may support R). It says that by my new evidence, I may become justified
in believing R, but cannot become justified in believing ~BIV. The crucial
question is whether Closure applies to dynamic epistemic operators. The
correct answer is that they do not. To see this consider a conjunction like
(G&M): Graham is a citizen of a North American nation and Maitzen
is a citizen of Borneo (picking this country at random). Suppose I am
at present now nowhere near being justified in believing G&M. I then
meet Maitzen at the Central Division APA, and he assures me that he is
from Borneo, showing me his Borneo passport. My new evidence E, by
boosting M, may hugely boost the probability (justifiedness, etc.) of the
conjunction G&M; yet it does nothing to boost the probability of G, the
first conjunct.20
My thesis, then, is that Closure doesn’t hold for dynamic “supports”;
it pertains to static senses only.21 It says that if you see that R entails ~BIV,
then it is not possible for you, on some specified body of evidence, to be
(statically) justified in believing R, and also to be unjustified in believing
~BIV. Closure and CORNEA thus pertain to diﬀerent things. Returning
now to the trouble-making counterexamples, let us see in more detail
whether, when Closure is properly Carnapped, the trouble is reduced.
6. Letting the Donkey Out of the Cage
Current contextualist theories get much appeal from their oﬀer to explain
our conflicting intuitions about local skeptical paradoxes of the “painted
donkey” sort. It is interest, therefore, whether these paradoxes get some
of their grip from neglecting the Carnap Distinction. To see how they
might, let’s first generate the paradox in a deliberately conflationary
“when seeing” locution:
When seeing the striped critter in the cage, I am justified in believing I see a zebra. That I see a zebra self—evidently entails that I am
not seeing a cleverly painted-in-stripes donkey (~PID), so I must
(by closure) be justified in believing it too. But how, when seeing
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the zebra-looking critter, can I be justified in believing that I’m not
seeing a cleverly painted donkey? After all, this is just how things
would look if it were a cleverly-painted donkey.
Here the locution “when seeing” deliberately obscures the distinction
between saying “On observing O, I am justified in believing B” and saying “By observing O, I become justified in believing B.” We are then
immediately torn between an intuition grounded on Closure and one
grounded on CORNEA. The Carnapian Distinction allows us to describe
the situation more discerningly in terms of two complementary truths,
T1 and T2:
It is true that (T1) by seeing the striped critter in the cage, I can
become justified in believing that (Z) I see a zebra, even though, by
seeing this, I cannot become justified in believing it is not a paintedin-stripes donkey. (This is, after all, just how it would look if it were
a painted donkey, so by CORNEA its looking that way cannot (dynamically) render me justified in believing it’s not one.). But it is also
true that (T2) if, on my evidence I am justified in believing that it is
a zebra in the case, I am also, on this evidence, justified in believing
it is not a painted-in-stripes donkey in the cage. (For I see that the
first believed proposition entails the second, and on my evidence I
am justified in believing the first, so by Closure I am also justified
in believing the second.
Here again, as in the Phat Vat case, the apparent conflict between CORNEA
and Closure has evaporated. Indeed, using the two principles in tandem
allows us to identify the conditions under which both truths can hold. Suppose I do, by observing the cage, become fully justified in believing that a
zebra is in the cage—so that , by Closure, I am also (seeing the obvious
entailment) justified in believing that (~PID) it is not a painted-in-stripes
donkey in the cage. CORNEA says that I cannot, by new input E, have
become justified in believing ~PID. Accordingly, this proposition must be
something that it was justified for me to believe before, or independently of,
the new input E.
Let TE be your total evidence, consisting both of the evidence T that
you have apart from looking in the cage, and your new evidence E of
what you see on looking in the cage. CORNEA says that E has no boosting
power with respect to ~PID, so that if you are now justified in believing
~PID, it is by virtue of what was available to you before input E—on, in
other words, your background evidence T.22
Does this Carnapian solution fit our common sense intuitions? I
venture that for painted donkeys, it does. So far as I can see, our background evidence gives us no reason to think that there has ever been, in
the entire history of the universe, a painted donkey substituted for a zebra
in a real zoo. If this is so, the new visual data of seeing a striped equine in
the zebra cage may be needed to rule out the possibility that the zebra is
convalescing at the animal hospital, or out for breeding; it won’t need to
rule out there being a painted donkey in the cage.23 That hypothesis is a
non-starter before you’ve bought your ticket.
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7. Escaping the Phat Vat

Does this line of analysis also work for Phat Vat cases? The diﬃculty
here, as Stewart Cohen notes, is that the “global” character of a Phat Vat
hypothesis seems to absorb in advance any possible evidence against it.24
How then it be antecedently improbable on one’s total evidence?
Here I think it helps to fill in the BIV scenario so as to make the BIV
possibility less mind-numbingly improbable. Suppose, in the scenario
sketched earlier, that you are Neo, of Matrix fame, acclaimed as “The
One” by your fawning band of grungy rebels. And suppose that the reason you’ve stayed up so late is that your total evidence, T, includes recently-acquired compelling evidence that the Matrix has been capturing your
rebel comrades one by one, de-bodying them and envatting their brains,
and wiring the brains in phat vats so to give them a perfectly simulated
virtual rebel life. (Your evidence consists of having recently found the vats,
with the lifeless debrained corpses of your friends nearby, and of having
entered—using your Neotic powers—into their new virtual worlds, so as
to see what their current virtual realities are.) It is this total evidence that
has kept you up late, brooding about the very real possibility that you
yourself have now been captured and similarly envatted.25 Indeed, given
the apparent rate of disappearance of your friends, you correctly gauged
this as having at least a probability of .01. It is about this that you are
again brooding as you now (E) hear the familiar sound of what you hope
is your 6:00 a.m. alarm clock going oﬀ, and form the belief (R) that you are
hearing your real alarm clock ringing.
Properly Carnapped, Closure and CORNEA tell a coherent story here.
CORNEA dictates that your new experiential input does not and cannot
“dynamically” justify you in believing ~BIV: you cannot, by E, become justified in believing ~BIV. Hence, if, on your disturbing prior evidence T, it is
unjustified for you to believe ~BIV before hearing the ringing, then it also
unjustified for you to believe this after hearing the ringing. Now, if hearing
the ringing sound suﬃciently increases your justifiedness in believing R, to
the point of your becoming justified (on your total evidence) in believing
this, then Closure dictates that you are, on your total evidence, also justified in believing ~BIV. But Closure does not say what makes you justified
in believing this latter claim: it doesn’t say, most crucially, that your new
ringing-sound evidence plays any dynamic evidential role here. Closure
thus leaves open the possibility that the the ringing-sound dynamically
makes you justified in believing R only if you were, on T alone, already justified in believing ~BIV. This possibility satisfies both CORNEA and Closure.
But how could T “improbabilize” an all-absorbing global Phat Vat
hypothesis, so as to make it a non-starter? This must remain the big question, but here I find our amplified Neo tale at least suggestive. It suggests
that we can imagine possible worlds, not so very unlike our own, in which
we have, to degrees that we can imaginatively vary up or down at will,
much more empirical evidence than we now have that there exist superior
beings (envatters) doing brain-in-vat enslavements of humans. We can
similarly imagine worlds where we have less evidence for this than we
now have (worlds where, for example, we lack our current knowledge
about technology producing sensations by electrical stimulation of the
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cortex, or about the billions of galaxies around us). Since our actual world
is on this evidential continuum, we are not in an evidential vacuum about
the general hypothesis that there are envatters, and our actual evidence
surely tilts very strongly against this general hypothesis. And the Phat
Vat hypothesis, due to its highly specific character, may occupy such a
small possible-world space within this general hypothesis, as to give it,
relative to the general hypothesis, an infinitesimally small logical probability. These are, of course, hard matters to discern clearly: how empirical
and logical probabilities interact is obscure terrain, and here we perhaps
just do not know our way about. But I do not see that the global character
of a phat-vat hypothesis precludes that our total evidence justifies us in
believing we are not in a phat vat. Nor does CORNEA preclude this, since
it addresses only dynamic support from situational new evidential input,
not static support on total evidence.
8. Graham and Maitzen’s Argument
My aim here has been to use the Carnapian Distinction to reduce Closure
befuddlement, allowing Closure to harmonize with CORNEA. I now turn
to specifics in Graham and Maitzen’s argument. I see two main missteps
here. First, after quoting the 1984 oﬃcial formulation of CORNEA (see
section 1 above), the authors say: “Wykstra oﬀers CORNEA as a necessary
condition for being “entitled to assert claims of the form it appears that p.”
But this isn’t right. In the oﬃcial formulation, the “only if” clause within
CORNEA is posited as necessary condition for being entitled to an appearsclaim on the basis of some specified input from a cognized situation. This
basis-relation is to be understood in the dynamic sense of “supports” to
which, in the sections preceding the oﬃcial formulation, I gave much attention. The authors are for this reason mistaken in claiming that one cannot,
given CORNEA, be entitled to assert “It appears that I’m not a brain in the
Phat Vat” when in the situation described above. CORNEA entails only
that I cannot become entitled to assert this, on the basis of the new evidential
input of the situation.
This connects closely to a second mistake. The authors note that in their
complex Phat Vat case, the CORNEA condition is satisfied for a conjunction
but not for one of its conjuncts: this is correct even in simpler cases, as we
have seen (see note 14). But they take this as a reductio, posing a question
meant as rhetorical:
[H]ow could you satisfy CORNEA for asserting a conjunction even
when one of its conjuncts does not—indeed, cannot—epistemically
appear to you to be true? This result is bad enough by itself, especially
in light of the evidential sense of “appears” that Wykstra invokes:
how could your total evidence support a conjunction while failing to
support one of its conjuncts? How could you be evidentially better-oﬀ
with respect to (p & q) than you are with respect to p?
But the CORNEA requirement is for dynamic epistemic operators only.
In cases where q fails the CORNEA test though p&q passes, CORNEA
doesn’t at all entail that (italics mine) “your total evidence fails to support q
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(though it supports p&q),” nor that you are “overall better oﬀ with respect
to p&q than with respect to q.” It entails only that your new evidential input
cannot dynamically boost q, (though it may dynamically boost p&q): your
new situational input cannot “boost” you into being epistemically better
oﬀ than you were before with respect to q (though it may do so for p&q). And
the Carnapian Distinction has allowed us to see that this does not violate
Closure, once this is duly restricted to static epistemic operators.
Calvin College

NOTES
I thank my Calvin colleagues for comments on an earlier draft, and especially
thank Del Ratzsch for his practical help.
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9. Getting the formulation right, which will vary with the operator involved, is no small task. I insert “also the case” as an aid to keeping closure
principles distinct from transmission principles like the one in Gettier (1963),
with which they are sometimes confused. Here see Peter Klein, “Closure
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Matters: Academic Skepticism and Easy Knowledge,” in Philosophical Issues,
14, 2004: Epistemology, ed. E. Sosa and E. Villanueva, pp. 166–10, and Jessica
Brown, “Doubt, Circularity, and the Moorean Response to the Sceptic,” in
Philosophical Perspectives 19, 2005: Epistemology, ed. John Hawthorne, pp. 2–4.
10. I use the term “Phat” on the advice of my hip–hop savvy colleague
Matt Halteman, who assures me that this fits the paradigm use of “phat” as
an adjective predicated of hyper–accessorized cars (“pimp mobiles,” I believe
Matt called them) and the like.
11. CORNEA gives the test as a necessary condition of serious support, not
a suﬃcient condition: it thus doesn’t sanction “does” here.
12. It is to be noted that the authors ground Claims 1 and 2 on standard
possible–world semantics for subjunctives. I originally meant the subjunctive
formulation to express probabilistic implications of theories, with Bayes’s theorem in mind; the appropriateness of Lewis–Stalnaker semantics here needs scrutiny. At any rate, using standard semantics, the idea is that in the closest possible
world where the alarm is not ringing, you do not hear it ringing, making it true
(on the standard semantics) that if it were not ringing, your experience would
be diﬀerent. But in the closest possible world where you are in the Phat Vat, you
do hear it ringing (having the ringing experience built in is part of what makes
the Phat Vat hypothesis phat), so on standard semantics it is not true that if you
were a brain in the Phat Vat, your experience would be diﬀerent.
13 Those picky about the entailment can add to the Phat Vat hypothesis
that the real alarm is not coincidentally ringing
14. While the authors argue this using a complex scenario, it readily falls out
of my simpler scenario. Since R entails ~BIV, we can think of it as the conjunction
of ~BIV and R*, where R* is just that surplus content in R that goes beyond ~BIV.
The argument just given, then, “shows” that CORNEA entails that (R* & ~BIV)
may be supported by my evidence even though one of its conjuncts (~BIV) is
not. In its appears–variant, it thus seems that CORNEA entails that you can be
entitled to say “It appears that R* & ~BIV,” even though you are not entitled to
say “It appears that ~BIV.”
15. The argument supposes that the observer can’t tell zebras and donkeys
apart by anatomical features other than coloration. We can of course always
let the hypothesis posit a donkey—a Phat Donkey as it were—that has had
whatever reconstructive surgery is needed to ensure this.
16. Stewart Cohen, “Contextualism and Skepticism,” in Philosophical Issues,
10, 2000: Skepticism, ed. E. Sosa and E. Villanueva p. 99.
17. These distinctions are made in section 1.3 (entitled “Rational Support”)
in Wykstra [1984]. The weak/strong distinction was made as follows:
Let us say that evidence e weakly supports (or confirms) claim c when e
makes c to some degree more likely to be true than it would have been on
the antecedent evidence. And let us say that e strongly supports (or confirms) he when it increases the likelihood suﬃciently to make c ‘reasonable to believe’ by a person who appreciates that evidence.’ A parallel distinction can be drawn between a strong and weak sense of ‘disconfirms.’
18. Rudolf Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, 2nd Edition (Chicago: 1962), pp. 468–78. The relevance of Carnap’s distinction to atheology was
stressed by Edward Wierenga, “Reply to Harold Moore’s ‘Evidence, Evil, and
Religious Belief,’” in International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 9, 1978: pp.
246–51.
19. David Anderson gives this example in his fine 2005 undergraduate
honors thesis “Epistemic Humility and William Rowe’s Evidential Argument
from Evil,” and in an unpublished paper “CORNEA Under Fire.”
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20. Graham and Maitzen, expressing debt to Dave Anderson, concede as
much in a footnote, but without seeing the full bearing of the point.
21. In the probabilistic idiom, closure says that if R has a probability over .5
(or some other threshold of interest) on some data of interest, then anything R
entails also has a probability of at least .5 on this same data. This is a well known
rule in confirmation theory. Failure to see it holds only for the static sense vitiated Rowe’s first (never published) objection against CORNEA, answered in
my (never published) “Diﬃculties in Rowe’s Case for Atheism (and in one of
Plantinga’s fustigations against it)”, read on the Queen Mary in 1981.
22. In showing the relevance of the Carnapian distinction here, I do not
mean to be claiming that the distinction entirely resolves the puzzle arising
in such cases. My claim is only that the distinction, by eliminating a specious
source of paradox, promises to help clarify any remaining deeper source of
paradox.
23. I am not yet ready to succumb to a contextualist account of what makes
alternative possibilities epistemically relevant. The Carnapian Distinction itself
helps ease the tensions that make contextualism so attractive.
24. Cohen, “Contextualism and Skepticism” (see note 16), p. 103. Cohen
considers biting the bullet by appealing to a priori probabilities; I find this helpful, but suggest (below) incorporating it within an appeal to an “evidential
continuum.”
25. You realize, of course, the cruel anti–irony that if you currently are
envatted, the Matrix is tormenting you with a virtual reality giving you nonveridical evidential omens of your plight. Your evidence may not be veridical,
but you are damned if it isn’t even more than if it is.

